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I. INTRODUCTION
After five years of congressional hearings, floor debates, and
compromises,1 the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amend-
ments (EFOIA)2 became law on October 2, 1996.3 Congress enacted
* Copyright © 1998 Martin E. Halstuk
t The author is a Ph.D. candidate specializing in media law and policy at the University of
Florida; M.A., University of Florida, 1997; B.A., Loyola University of Chicago, 1970. He is a for-
mer reporter for the San Francisco Chronicle and Night City Editor of the San Francisco Exam-
iner. The author wishes to thank UF Brechner Eminent Scholar of Mass Communication Professor
Bill F. Chamberlin for his guidance in the preparation of this article.
1. In 1991 Sen. Patrick Leahy introduced the Electronic Freedom of Information Improve-
ment Act of 1991. See Senate Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Technology and the Law of the
Committee on the Judiciary. See S. 1940, 102d Cong. § 5 (1991); H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 14
(1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448, 3457.
2. See Electronic Freedom of Information Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, §§ 1-12, 110
Stat. 3048, (1996) (codified as amended in various sections of 5 U.S.C. § 552).
3. On September 20, 1996, Congress presented the Electronic Freedom of Information Act
Amendments to President Clinton for his signature. He signed the bill into law on October 2, 1996.
74 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGYLAWJOURNAL
the EFOIA, which amended the Freedom of Information Act of 1966
(FOIA),4 for two principal reasons. First, Congress wanted to clarify
that the federal disclosure statute applied equally to agency records
maintained in electronic formats as well as to paper formats.5 Second,
Congress wanted to make a number of administrative and procedural
changes to help ease serious delays and backlogs in government re-
sponses to FOIA requests.6
The purpose of this article is to shed light on the goals and impli-
cations of one of the EFOIA's key electronic provisions, Section 3.7
According to a 1996 House report' that accompanied the legislation,
one of the purposes of Section 3 was to explicitly reject a 1976 defini-
tion of "agency records" used by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in SDC Development Corp. v. Mathews.9 In SDC De-
velopment Corp. v. Mathews, the Ninth Circuit held that a widely used
medical database compiled and stored in a computer data bank by a
federal agency did not qualify as an "agency record" for the purposes
of the FOIA.10
The implications of this provision need to be examined for several
reasons pertaining to important issues of information warehousing,
federal information dissemination, and economics. First, the federal
government is increasingly involved in the gathering, storage, and ma-
nipulation of information in electronic form and digital formats, in-
cluding the creation of databases.11 Second, both profit-making and
4. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
5. See H.R. REP.NO. 104-795, at 11 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448,3452.
6. See id. at 13-14. In June 1996, for example, the FBI had a 4-year-backlog in responding
to FOIA requests. See id. at 16 (citing statement of U.S. Rep. Steven Horn at a hearing on federal
information policy before the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Tech-
nology of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, June 13, 1996).
7. See Electronic Freedom of Information Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-231, §§ 1-12,110 Stat.
3048 (1996) (codified as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)). Section 3 is entitled Application of Re-
quirements to Electronic Format Information. The EFOIA comprises 12 sections in all, 10 of
which directly or indirectly address issues pertaining to the recording, storage, and disclosure of
electronic records. See id. §§ 1-6 and §§ 9-12. Sections 7 and 8 concern administrative and proce-
dural changes that deal with delays in processing FOIA requests and backlogs. See id. §§ 7, 8
(codified as amended in subsection (a)(6) of 5 U.S.C. § 552). These two sections are beyond the
scope of this analysis.
8. See H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 20 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448,3463.
9. See SDC Dev. Corp. v. Mathews, 542 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1976). The appellant, F.
David Mathews, was Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.
10. See id. at 1120-21.
11. See Management of Federal Information Resources Notice, 59 Fed. Reg. 37,906, 37,910
(1994). See also Matthew D. Bunker, Sigman L. Splichal, Bill F. Chamberlin and Linda M. Perry,
Applying Legal Doctrine to Emerging Technology, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 543,559-60 (1993).
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nonprofit organizations request government-held information for a va-
riety of uses, including dissemination to other users.12 Third, govern-
ment information stored electronically is potentially far more valuable
than the equivalent data on paper because information in electronic
formats can be used and manipulated faster, easier, and at less cost. 13
In sum, the EFOJA's electronic provisions are tremendously important
to the future of public access to government-held information in the
electronic age.' 4 If effective, this statute can help keep the government
from restricting access to electronically recorded information and also
undercut efforts to establish information monopolies. 5 As the De-
partment of Justice observed, "no development in the history of the Act
has held as much potential for shaping [the FOIA's] contours, even the
very future of its implementation, as that of new technology."' 6
The general question this paper tries to answer is: What is the
practical effect of EFOIA Section 3, the electronic provision that Con-
gress crafted to reject the ruling in SDC Development Corp. v.
Mathews? Two important corollary queries flow from this broad cen-
tral question. First, does EFOIA Section 3 prevent the government
from selling - or at least from recovering its costs of producing -
databases compiled by federal agencies? Second, what is the practical
effect of EFOIA Section 3 in light of the 1989 U.S. Supreme Court
decision in U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press?7 There seems to be a conflict between the
congressional intent behind Section 318 and the Supreme Court's semi-
12. See generally Creative Ways of Using and Disseminating Federal Information:
Hearings Before the Government Information, Justice and Agriculture Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Government Operations, 102d Cong., Ist & 2d Sess. (1992).
13. See Robert M. Gellman, Twin Evils: Government Copyright and Copyright-like Con-
trols Over Government Information, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 999, 1003, 1036 (1995); Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., Unbundling Value in Electronic Information Products: Intellectual Property Protec-
tion for Machine Readable Interfaces, 20 RUTGERs COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 415, 418-22
(1994); Leo T. Sorokin, The Computerization of Government Information: Does It Circumvent
Public Access Under the Freedom of Information Act and the Depository Library Program? 24
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 267,277 (1991).
14. See XI FOIA UPDATE 2, at 3, (Spring/Summer 1990).
15. Law Professor Henry H. Perritt Jr. wrote that the Freedom of Information Act is an "in-
strument of the diversity principle. It undercuts efforts to establish information monopolies because
it grants private sector redisseminators an entitlement to public information notwithstanding agency
efforts to block access in order to support exclusive distribution arrangements." HENRY H.
PERRITr, JR., LAW AND THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY 477 (1996).
16. See FOIA UPDATE, supra note 14.
17. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749 (1989) (hereinafter Reporters Comm.).
18. See H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 20 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448,3463.
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nal ruling in Reporters Committee.19 The House report accompanying
the EFOIA said information an agency has created and is directly dis-
seminating remains subject to the FOIA in any of its forms or for-
mats.20 But according to the Reporters Committee opinion, public ac-
cess to government information under the FOIA is limited to only
"official information that sheds light on an agency's performance of its
statutory duties." 21
To gain some insight into these questions, this paper will discuss
the background of the Freedom of Information Act in the next section.
Section III will outline the EFOIA in general. Section IV will examine
EFOIA Section 3 and analyze SDC Development Corp. v. Mathews.
Section V will discuss the economic implications of EFOIA Section 3.
Section VI will explore the implications of the Reporters Committee
decision. Finally, sections VII and VIII will offer some concluding
perspectives on the important issues raised in this analysis. This arti-
cle will conclude that Congress needs to amend the FOIA further in
one specific area in order to fulfill the statute's broad policy of full
disclosure.
II. THE FREEDOM OF IrFORMATION ACT
An understanding of the FOIA's legislative history and historic
roots is important because the statute's broad policy of full disclosure22
is the foundation on which the EFOIA is built In addition, the Act's
legislative history is especially relevant to the latter parts of this analy-
sis.
Passed by Congress in 1966 and subsequently amended in signifi-
cant respects,23 the FOIA creates a judicially enforceable policy that
favors a general philosophy of full disclosure. 24  The Act applies to
19. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 772-74 (holding that the disclosure of computerized
FBI compilations of an individual's criminal records is an unwarranted invasion of privacy under
FOIA Exemption 7(C) when the request does not seek official information that directly sheds light
on an agency's performance of its statutory duties).
20. See H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 20 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448, 3463.
House and Senate reports are integral parts of a statute's legislative history. Therefore, they can
influence court determinations on how to properly apply a law.
21. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773.
22. See Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360 (1976); Environmental
Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973).
23. Congress revised the FOIA in 1974, 1976 and 1986 before it enacted the electronic
amendments in 1996. These earlier amendments will be discussed later in this analysis.
24. See S. REP. No. 89-813 (1965), reprinted in FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE
BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES, ARTICLES 38, (1974) [hereinafter THE FOIA SOURCE
BOOK]. THE FOIA SoURCE BOOK of the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure
[Vol. 15
1999] ELECTRONIC FREEDOM OFINFORMATIONACT 77
"records" held by "agencies" within the executive branch of the federal
government,25 including the Executive Office of the President and in-
dependent regulatory agencies2 6 such as the Federal Communications
Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Securities
and Exchange Commission. The FOIA makes agency records avail-
able to the public2 7 upon request and places the burden of justifying
nondisclosure on the government.28 The FOIA does not include records
maintained by state or local governments, by the courts, by Congress,
or by private citizens.2 9
The statute is potentially one of the most valuable tools of inquiry
available to the general public, journalists, scholars, and others who
want to know what the federal government is doing.30 For instance, in
the months preceding the October 1996 enactment of the EFOIA, rec-
ords released under the statute revealed Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) actions against Valujet before the May 11, 1996 crash into
the Everglades that killed all on board; the unsafe lead content of tap
water in Washington, D.C.; the U.S. government's treatment of South
Vietnamese commandos who fought in a CIA-sponsored army in the
early 1960s; and the types of tax cases that the IRS recommends for
criminal prosecution.3
In crafting the Freedom of Information Act, Congress recognized
it is crucial for citizens in a democracy to have access to government
information to make informed decisions.32  The FOIA prevents politi-
cians and bureaucrats from being the exclusive judges of what the
of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, is a primary source for the legislative history of the
FOIA. See also Rose, 425 U.S. at 360-361. But see U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm.,
489 U.S. 749, 774-75 (1989) (holding that the "central purpose" of the FOIA is to disclose only
those records that directly shed light on the operations of government.)
25. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(0 (1994), amended by Electronic Freedom of Information Act
Amendments of 1996,5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1)(2) (West 1996 & Supp. 1998).
26. See id.
27. See5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1994).
28. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)(b) (1994). See also National Labor Relations Bd. v. Rob-
bins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 234-236 (1977); Environmental Protection Agency v.
Mink, 410 U.S. 73,79, 87-88 (1973).
29. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY, FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT GumE & PRIVACY ACT OvERvIEw 18 (1997).
30. See 142 CONG. REC. S10713-03 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
31. Seeid.
32. H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, pt. 1 (1966), reprinted in THE FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra
note 24, at 33. "A democratic society requires an informed, intelligent electorate, and the intelli-
gence of the electorate varies as the quantity and quality of its information varies... [The FOIA]
provides the necessary machinery to assure the availability of Government information necessary to
an informed electorate." Id.
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public can know. Congress also recognized that there are rightful rea-
sons to keep some information secret A 1965 Senate report, which
accompanied the original Freedom of Information Act, declared that
the public's statutory "right to know" 33 must be balanced against the
government's need to keep some information confidential.3 4 For this
reason, Congress created nine exemptions, under which federal agen-
cies may refuse to disclose information.35
Congress amended the FOIA four times since the law was en-
acted: 1974, 1976, 1986, and 1996. A discussion of the amendments
that preceded the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments
of 199636 is relevant to this discussion because the amendments -- es-
pecially those approved in 1974 and 1976 - evinced Congress' intent
for the FOIA to represent a broad policy of full disclosure. The intent
of the legislature in enacting the FOIA is important because the Act's
scope and purpose became significant issues in SDC Development
Corp. v. Mathews 37 and U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press,38 examined in Parts Ill, IV, and
V.
Congress amended the FOIA in 1974 with the intention to
strengthen the statute because there was a general reluctance by agen-
cies to comply with the law's policy of full disclosure.39 Federal agen-
cies had been interpreting the exemptions broadly to justify withhold-
33. The term "right to know" has been attributed to a 1945 speech by Kent Cooper, then Ex-
ecutive Director of the Associated Press. He is also the author of THE RIGHT TO KNow (1956).
34. "At the same time that a broad philosophy of 'freedom of information' is enacted into
law, it is necessary to protect certain equally important rights of privacy with respect to certain in-
formation in Government files, such as medical and personnel records. It is also necessary for the
very operation of our Government to allow it to keep confidential certain material, such as the in-
vestigatory files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation." S. REP. No. 89-813, pt.1 (1965), re-
printed in THE FOIA SoURCEBOOK, supra note 24, at 38.
35. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9)(1994). Briefly stated, the FOIA does not apply to matters
that fall under the categories of (1) classified information and national security, (2) internal agency
personnel information, (3) information exempted by other Congressional statutes, (4) trade secrets
and other confidential business information, (5) agency memoranda, (6) disclosures that invade
personal privacy, (7) law enforcement investigation records, (8) reports from regulated financial
institutions and (9) geological and geophysical information.
36. See Electronic Freedom of Information Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat.
3048, §§ 1-12 (1996) (codified as amended in various sections of 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994)).
37. See SDC Dev. Corp., 542 F.2d 1116 (9th Cit. 1976).
38. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
39. In a critique of the FOIA, then University of Chicago Law Professor Antonin Scalia char-
acterized the 1966 version of the Act as a "relatively toothless beast, sometimes kicked about
shamelessly by the agencies." Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes,
REGULATION, Mar.-Apr., 1982, at 15.
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ing documents, and officials often used various ploys to discourage use
of the FOIA, including high fees for copying documents, long delays,
and claims that they could not find the documents requested.40
The 1974 amendments required agencies to respond to informa-
tion requests within ten days or face a lawsuit,41 and directed each
agency to issue FOJA fee regulations for the recovery of only the direct
costs of search and duplication.42 A key revision authorized federal
judges to conduct in camera review of classified information in order
to confirm that the requested materials actually fell within the guide-
lines of Exemption 1, the national security exemption.43 Congress re-
vised Exemption 1 in direct response to a 1973 Supreme Court deci-
sion in EPA v. Mink.44 In deciding Mink, the Supreme Court
interpreted Exemption 1 broadly and held that classified documents
were exempt from judicial review.45 Congress acted to override the
Mink decision because legislators believed the Court's ruling conflicted
with the general philosophy of full disclosure evinced in FOIA.46
In 1976, Congress amended the FOIA for the second time because
legislators wanted to clarify Exemption 3. This exemption provided
that the FOJA did not apply to information clearly exempted by other
laws previously passed by Congress. 47 Legislators revised Exemption
3 to override a 1975 Supreme Court ruling with which Congress did
not agree.48 In Administrator, FAA v. Robertson,49 the Court held that
the FAA administrator possessed wide discretion to withhold requested
government records.50 Congress disagreed with the Court's broad con-
struction of Exemption 3.51 Legislators said the Supreme Court deci-
40. See ALLAN ROBERT ADLER, LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL OPEN GovERNMENT
LAws 8 (1995). In great part, this state of affairs was the result of sometimes vague or even poor
draftsmanship of the FOIA. Criticism of the Act ranged from the subtle - "hardly... the apogee of
legislative draftsmanship" - to the blunt - "primitive and ineffective." JAMES T. O'REILLY,
FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE - PROCEDURES, FORMS AND THE LAW § 3.01, 3-2 (1990).
41. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (1994).
42. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1380, at 7 (1974).
43. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(B) (1994).
44. See Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
45. See id. at 84.
46. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1380, at 11-12 (1974); S. REP. No. 93-1200, at 12 (1974).
47. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1994).
48. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-880, at 23 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2204,2205.
49. See Adm'r, Federal Aviation Adm'n v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975).
50. See id. at 266-67.
51. In a House subcommittee report accompanying the proposed amendment, Congress spe-
cifically stated that the Supreme Court "misconceiv[ed] the intent of Exemption (3) .... H.R.
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sion allowed an agency administrator "carte blanche to withhold any
information he pleases. 52 Consequently, Congress revised Exemption
3 to create guidelines that strictly limit the discretion of an agency's
executive to withhold information from the public.5 3 This change is
significant because, by expressly limiting agency discretion for with-
holding, the amendment reflected a congressional FOIA policy that fa-
vors disclosure.54
Congress revised the FOIA for the third time in 1986 when legis-
lators amended the Act by passing the Freedom of Information Reform
Act of 1986.55 The amendment provided broader exemption protection
for law enforcement information and added new exclusions for law en-
forcement records under Exemption 7, FOIA's law enforcement ex-
ception.56 More pertinent to this analysis, however, the 1986 amend-
ment also created new provisions that liberalized fees and fee
waivers.57 Under these guidelines, fees recover only a small portion of
the costs of responding to requests, thus making information economi-
cally accessible.58 The legislative history of the 1974 amendments in-
dicate that the fee adjustments were specifically intended by Congress
to help further the statute's broad policy of full disclosure.5 9  As a
Ninth Circuit opinion noted, the amendment liberalized fees so that the
FOIA charges could not be used "for the purpose of discouraging re-
quests for information or as obstacles to disclosure of requested infor-
mation." 60
An examination of the FOIA amendments of 1974, 1976, and
1986 shows that these revisions comport with Congress' intent that the
Act represent a broad policy of full disclosure, limited only by the nine
exemptions, 61 which must be narrowly construed.62 The public policy
REP. No.94-880, at 23 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2204, 2205. See Sims v. Central
Intelligence Agency (hereinafter Sims I), 642 F.2d 562,567 (1980).
52. H.R. REP. No. 94-880, at 23 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2204, 2205.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1994).
56. See id.
57. See id. § 552(a)(4)(A)(i-vii). The FOIA fee structure will be discussed in Part IV of this
analysis.
58. See id.
59. See Long v. Internal Revenue Service, 596 F.2d 362, 366-67 (1979) (holding that the
expenses of editing computerized records cannot justify an agency's decision to refuse to segregate
disclosable materials subject to the FOIA).
60. Id. quoting S. REP. NO. 1200-93 (1974).
61. See id. § 552(b)(1-9). See note 35, supra and accompanying text.
62. See Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352,361 (1976).
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behind the FOIA was echoed by President Johnson 63 when he signed
the FOIA into law on July 4, 1966:
This legislation springs from one of our most essential principles:
A democracy works best when the people have all the information
that the security of the nation permits. No one should be able to
pull the curtain of secrecy around decisions which can be revealed
without injury to the public interest.64
The Supreme Court has also articulated Congress' intent for the
FOIA to represent a broad policy favoring disclosure. In a 1976
opinion written by Justice William J. Brennan in Department of the
Air Force v. Rose,65 the Court said the FOIA's legislative history
makes it "crystal clear" that the congressional objective for the Act
was to "pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency
action to the light of public scrutiny." 66 The Court further declared
that the FOIA's statutory language and legislative history indicate that
the statute was "broadly conceived ' 67 and its nine exemptions must be
narrowly construed.68 Justice Brennan wrote that these "limited ex-
emptions do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is
the dominant objective of the act."69
An analysis of the EFOIA amendments of 1996 reveals that Con-
gress wanted to maintain its broad policy of full disclosure by clarify-
ing that the statute applies to electronic records - a requirement that
Congress had not before explicitly stated.70
m. THE ELECTRONIC FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AMENDMENTS
When President Johnson signed the FOIA into law, the statute
made no mention of electronically recorded or stored information be-
cause government records were primarily produced on paper.71 In
1955, when congressional hearings began laying the foundation for the
63. See Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill Revising Public Information Provi-
sions of the Administrative Procedure Act, WKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 895 (July 4, 1966).
64. Id.
65. Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
66. Id. at 361 (quoting Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 495 F.2d. 261,263 (1974)).
67. Id. (quoting Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973)).
68. See Rose, 495 F.2d. 261, at 263.
69. Id.
70. See H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 11 (1996), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3454.
71. See INFORMING THE NATION: FEDERAL INFORMATION DISSEMINATION IN AN
ELECTRONIC AGE 207, Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-CIT-396, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office (Oct 1988).
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FOIA, the federal government had 45 computers.72 Ten years later,
when the Senate passed its version of the FOIA, the computer inven-
tory for the federal government was 1,826.73 The number jumped to
5,277 by 1970.74 By 1994, the federal government used about 25,250
small computers (costing $10,000 to $100,000 each); 8,500 medium
computers (costing $100,000 to $1 million each); and 890 large com-
puters (more than $1 million each).75 Other estimates for the number
of computers used by the federal government run even higher.76
Against this backdrop of rapid computerization combined with
the reluctance of agencies to apply the FOIA to electronic informa-
tion,77 as in SDC Development Corp. v. Mathews,78  Congress enacted
The Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996.79
The amendments were the culmination of years of efforts by Senator
Patrick Leahy and his supporters 0 to update the FOIA because public
access to electronic information had become a problem."t Beginning in
72. See S. REP. No. 104-272, at 8 (1996).
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. See BUNKER & SPLICHAL, supra note 11, at 559-60, citing GENERAL SERVS. ADMIN.,
FEDERAL EQUIPMENT DATA CENTER, AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT IN THE U.S.
GOvERNMENT (Apr. 1990).
77. "[Clonflict, uncertainty and reluctance on the part of many federal agencies in applying
the FOIA to electronic records warranted the development and application of uniform administra-
tive policies and practices." Federal Information Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Government Reform and Oversight on Government Management, Information and Technology,
available in 1996WL 10164964 (statement of Allan Robert Adler). See H.R. REP. No. 104-795,
at 12 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3455. See also, e.g., Dismukes v. Department of
the Interior, 603 F.Supp. 760 (D.D.C. 1984) (holding that an agency has no obligation to comply
with a FOIA requester's electronic-format preference); SDC Development Corp. v. Mathews, 542
F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that a requested biomedical and research database did not qual-
ify as an "agency record" under the FOIA.)
78. See SDCDev. Corp., 542 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1976).
79. See Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048, §§ 1-12 (1996) (codified as amended in vari-
ous sections of 5 U.S.C. § 552).
80. Support for passage of the EFOIA came from a variety of library, press, civil liberties,
consumer and research groups. 142 CONG. REC. S10715 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Leahy).
81. See supra note 1. Congress acknowledged as early as 1974 that maintenance of federal
agency records in computerized formats could potentially alter the calculus of information disclo-
sure requirements under the FOIA. See S. REp. No. 93-854, at 12 (1974). The report said:
[w]ith respect to agency records maintained in computerized form, the term 'search'
would include services functionally analogous to searches for records that are
maintained in conventional form. Difficulties may sometimes be encountered in
drawing clear distinctions between searches and other services involved in extracting
requested information from computerized record systems. Nonetheless, the [Senate
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the mid-1970s, some agencies rejected FOIA requests for records in
electronic form, arguing that the information did not qualify for disclo-
sure under the Act.12 The problem was underscored in some instances
when federal courts ruled against FOIA requesters in disputes with
agencies that withheld information that was recorded or stored elec-
tronically.13
The 1996 amendments establish that the rules for public access
under the FOIA apply equally to electronic records and paper rec-
ords,84 and a search request for electronic records using software is to
be treated the same as a paper search.8" The law states that a "record"
that is subject to the FOIA comprises information maintained by an
agency in any format, including an electronic format.86 Under the
EFOIA, agencies must make reasonable efforts (1) to provide a record
"in any form or format requested by the person if the record is readily
reproducible by the agency in that form or format,"87 and (2) to main-
tain records "in forms or formats that are reproducible" so that re-
quests for the information can be honored.88 The law also mandates
that when agency officials redact parts of an electronic record because
the information is determined to fall within one of the nine exemptions,
they must note the location and the extent of any deletions made on the
electronic record.89
Committee on the Judiciary] believes it desirable to encourage agencies to process
requests for computerized information even if doing so involves performing services
which the agencies are not required to provide - for example, using its computer to
identify records.
Id. Congress also recognized the problems of access to electronically recorded government-held
information in 1985 hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Op-
erations. Electronic Collection and Dissemination of Information by Federal Agencies: Hearings
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong. (1985).
82. See Dismukes v. Department of the Interior, 603 F.Supp. 760 (D.C. 1984); SDC Dev.
Corp. v. Mathews, 542 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1976).
83. See id.
84. See Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. 104-231, 110
Stat. 3048, 3049, § 3 (1996) (codified as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)).
85. See Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. 104-231, 110
Stat. 3048, 3049, § 4 (1996), amending § 552(a)(2).
86. See Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. 104-231, 110
Stat. 3048, 3049 § 3(2) (1996), amending § 552(f).
87. See Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. 104-231, 110
Stat. 3048, 3050, § 503) (1996), amending § 552(a)(3).
88. Id.
89. See Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. 104-231, 110
Stat. 3048, 3053, § 9 (1996), amending § 552(b).
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IV. EFOIA SECnTON 3 AND SDC DEVELOPMENT CoRP. v. MATHEvS
In all, the Electronic Freedom of Information Act comprises 12
sections,90 10 of which pertain directly or indirectly to electronic access
or dissemination issues. 9' EFOIA Sections 7 and 8 concern adminis-
trative and procedural changes that deal with delays in processing
FOIA requests and backlogs, and are beyond the scope of this analy-
sis.92 Section 3,93 the focus of this research project, clarifies the terms
"agency" and "record," and expressly states that agency records
maintained in electronic format are controlled by the requirements of
90. See Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. 104-231, 110
Stat. 3048, §§ 1-12(1996) (codified as amended in various sections of 5 U.S.C. § 552).
91. See id. §§ 1-6, 9-12.
92. The EFOIA's administrative and procedural provisions are beyond the scope of this
analysis. Briefly stated, the key provisions pertain to:
Multitrack processing: The EFOIA authorizes agencies to establish multi-track process-
ing systems for requests, based on the amount of time the agency requires to provide the information
and the timeliness needs of the requester. See Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments
of 1996, Pub. L. 104-231, § 7, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3050) (amending § 552(a)(6)(D)).
Expedited Processing: The expedited-processing provision gives priority to two catego-
ries of requesters. The first category comprises those who would face significant harm if they fail to
obtain information in a timely manner, including an imminent threat to life or physical safety. The
second category applies to requesters "primarily engaged in the disseminating information, urgency
to inform the public concerning actual or alleged Federal Government activity." See Electronic
Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231 §8, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(110 Stat. 3051), amending 5 U.S.C § 552(a)(6)(E) (1994). Although this category does not spe-
cifically mention the terms "press" or "news media," it was created in response to requests from
news media representatives and their supporters during EFOIA hearings. The requests came from
hearings witnesses such as Byron York, reporter for The American Spectator, and Eileen Welsom,
on behalf of the Society of Professional Journalists, the American Society of Newspaper Editors,
and the Newspaper Association of America. See H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 17 (1996), reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448, 3460. For example, Jane E. Kirtley, Executive Director of The Report-
ers Committee for Freedom of the Press, suggested in testimony that agencies should speed access
requests from the media "whenever records are requested that would enlighten the public on matters
where public concern is strong." Id.
Deadlines: The EFOIA extends the deadline to 20 work days for an agency to determine
whether it will comply with an information request. Previously, agencies needed to respond within
10 work days. See Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. 104-231,
§ 8, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3051) (amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(l)).
Agency Backlogs: The 1996 amendment reinforces the requirement that agencies must
respond to requests on time. Under the EFOIA, agencies can no longer delay responses to FOIA
requests by citing "exceptional circumstances" simply because the delay results from a predictable
agency workload. Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
231 §7, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3051) (amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(6)(C) (1994)).
93. See Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. 104-231 §8,
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3051) (codified as amended in 5 U.S.C. 552(f)).
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the FOIA in the same way as paper records. 94 The section states that
the FOIA is amended as follows:
(f) For purposes of this section, the term-
(1) "agency" as defined in section 551(1) of this title in-
cludes any executive department, military department, Gov-
ernment corporation, Government controlled corporation, or
other establishment in the executive branch of the Govern-
ment (including the Executive Office of the President), or
any independent regulatory agency; and
(2) "record" and any other term used in this section in refer-
ence to information includes any information that would be
an agency record subject to the requirements of this section
when maintained by an agency in any format, including an
electronic format.95
There are several reasons why Section 3 is significant: First, it
provides, for the first time, a FOIA definition for the term "record,"
which the statute never explained before.96 The Freedom of Informa-
tion Act defined the term "agency," but it did not define either "record"
or "agency record." And still, the term "agency record" is not defined
in the FOIA or any of its amendments. 97 Second, the section helped
bridge the gap between law and technology9 by making clear that the
term "record" applies to information in any format, including elec-
tronic formats.99 A 1996 House report that accompanied the EFOIA10
94. See H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 19 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448,3462.
95. Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. 104-231 § 3, 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3051).
96. See id.
97. In 1989, 10 years after the Ninth Circuit decided SDC Dev. Corp. v. Mathews, a Su-
preme Court case clarified the meaning of the term "agency record" under the FOIA. In U.S. Dep't
of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136 (1989), the Court noted that two requirements must be
met for materials to qualify as "agency records." First, an agency must "either create or obtain" the
material. Id. at 144 (quoting Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 182 (1980)). Second, the agency
must be in control of the materials at the time the FOIA request is made. Il at 145 (citing Kissinger
v. Reporters Comm., 445 U.S. 136, 157 (1980)).
98. Professor Sandra Davidson Scott noted that disparities between law and technology can
restrict or slow public access to government information. Undesirable social and political conse-
quences would result because decreased access to government information creates a climate that
tends toward a closed society rather than an open one. See Sandra Davidson Scott, Suggestions for
a Model Statutefor Access to Computerized Government Records, 2 WM. & MARY BML OF RTs.
J. 29,30 (1993).
99. See Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. 104-231 §3,
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3051).
100. See H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 20 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448,3463.
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illuminates the congressional intent behind another of Section 3's pur-
poses - to explicitly reject a 1976 definition of "agency records" used
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in SDC Develop-
ment Corp. v. Mathews.1' 1
In SDC Development Corp. v. Mathews, the Ninth Circuit held
that a widely used medical database, compiled and stored in a com-
puter data bank by the National Library of Medicine, did not qualify as
an "agency record" for the purposes of the FOIA. 102 Because the term
"record" was not defined in the FOIA at that time, the Ninth Circuit
decided to draw its definition of an "agency record" from a portion of
the Records Disposal Act that deals with library materials. 03 The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that a definition keyed to library materials was
appropriate because the requested information was compiled by the
National Library of Medicine.' °4
But according to the EFOIA House report, the Ninth Circuit's
holding was inconsistent with the general policy of full disclosure ex-
pressed in the FOA.105 The House report said the Ninth Circuit used
the library material exclusion in the Records Disposal Act "as an ex-
cuse to place these records beyond the reach" of the FOIA. 10 6 The
EFOIA, the House report said, now "makes clear, contrary to SDC
Development Corp. v. Mathews, that information an agency has cre-
ated and is directly or indirectly disseminating remains subject to the
FOIA in any of its forms or formats.' ' 7
SDC Development Corp. v. Mathews, a complex case and one of
the earliest cases in computer access litigation under the FOIA, 08
serves as an illustration of how the ability to control and manipulate
information in electronic formats makes electronically stored informa-
tion more desirable and potentially far more valuable than equivalent
data on paper.109 But compiling data, incorporating it into a software
delivery system, and maintaining it can be costly, which is the issue
101. SDC Dev. Corp. v. Mathews, 542 F.2d 1116 (1976).
102. Seeid. at 1120-21.
103. Id. at 1120, n. 8, (citing 44 U.S.C. §§ 2901, 3301).
104. See id.
105. See H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 20 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448,3463.
106. Id.
107. Id
108. See, e.g., Dismukes v. Department of the Interior, 603 F.Supp. 760 (D.D.C. 1984); Yea-
ger v. Drug Enforcement Administration, 678 F.2d 315 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Forsham v. Harris, 445
U.S. 169 (1980); Long v. Internal Revenue Service, 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1979).
109. See Perritt, supra note 13; see also Gellman, supra note 13.
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that prompted the FOIA access request in SDC Development Corp. v.
Mathews."0
In this case, SDC Development Corp., a private, commercial user
of biomedical and research information, made a FOIA request to ob-
tain a database of the Medical Literature Analysis and Retrieval Sys-
tem (MEDLARS) for $500 - the nominal cost of reproduction."'
The MEDLARS database was created by the National Library of
Medicine (NLM), a federal agency1 2 established by Congress in 1956
as a division of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare.1 3 The MEDLARS family of databases - a computerized sys-
tem for storing, indexing, and retrieving medical bibliographical
data - is an important and basic resource that is widely used in the
biomedical and research communities. 1
14
At the time, public access to the MEDLARS tapes was available
online through MEDLINE,"15 the National Library of Medicine's on-
line database system. But MEDLINE users were required to pay an
hourly rate of $8 to $15 per hour for access to the MEDLARS tapes,
depending on time of day; the higher rate applied to prime use hours.
16
Additionally, the computer tapes were available on an annual sub-
scription basis for $50,000 through the National Technical Information
Service, ' 17 a clearinghouse for the collection of scientific, technical,
and engineering information for dissemination to industry, business,
government, and the general public.' 8
110. See SDCDev. Corp., 542 F.2d at 1118.
111. Seeid.
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 286(a) (1994).
113. See id. § 275. The Department later became the Department of Health and Human
Services.
114. The MEDLARS database contains citations and abstracts of 2 million biomedical re-
search articles from about 3,000 medical and scientific journals. See SDC Dev. Corp., 542 F. 2d at
1117 n.l.
115. See SDCDev. Corp., 542F.2dat 1117.
116. See id. In 1976, when the Ninth Circuit heard the case, about 350 institutions subscribed
to the MEDLINE online service. See L
117. See SDCDev. Corp., 542F. 2dat 1117-18.
118. See The Technical Information Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1151-57 (1994). The database is up-
dated annually, which is why subscribers must renew each year at the full subscription fee of
$50,000 if they want to stay current. At oral arguments before the Ninth Circuit, the government
said that no individual or institution had as yet paid $50,000 for the tapes. Instead, the NLM had
entered into agreements under which universities and foreign government can have the tapes in ex-
change for services such as cataloguing, indexing and abstracting of medical publications to update
the database. See 542 F.2d at 1118 n.4.
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The public also could have access to a printed version of the re-
quested database, called Index Medicus, for the nominal cost of repro-
duction." 9 However, a printed listing is not as useful to or convenient
for users of the information as a database could be. 20 For example,
the user would have to incur the expense of rekeying the text into a
computer, building the indices, and creating computerized search ca-
pability. Furthermore, a printed text is not updated as quickly or as
easily as its computerized counterpart, which can be continually up-
dated. In other words, information in electronic formats is more valu-
able than the same data on paper because information users can ma-
nipulate the electronic information more efficiently.121
SDC Development Corp. brought suit in the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California after the government refused to
release the MEDLARS database for nominal reproduction costs. The
district court entered a summary judgment in favor of the govern-
ment. 22 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court deci-
sion, holding that the requested database did not qualify as an "agency
record" under the FOIA.'23
SDC's argument for access consisted of what the Ninth Circuit
described as a "simple syllogism": 124 The FOIA requires reproduction,
at a nominal cost, for all agency records not falling within one of the
listed exemptions. The MEDLARS tapes were agency records, not
specifically exempted. Therefore, the tapes must be reproduced at
nominal cost.'25 Under the FOIA's fee structure, access fees essen-
tially cover only the cost of search and reproduction. 26
The Ninth Circuit, however, rejected SDC's premise that the
MEDLARS tapes were agency records. The appellate court's analy-
sis, written for the three-judge panel by then-Circuit Judge Anthony M.
Kennedy, now a Supreme Court Justice, began by noting that the terms
"record" and "agency records" are not specifically defined by the stat-
ute. 27 The Ninth Circuit turned to the FOIA's legislative history for
119. See SDC Dev. Corp., 542 F.2d at 1117.
120. See Gellman, supra note 13.
121. See Bunker & Splichal, supra note 11, at 560-61. See generally Perritt, supra note 13.
122. See SDCDev. Corp., 542 F.2d at 1118.
123. Id. at 1120-21.
124. Id. at 1118.
125. See id.
126. See 5 U.S.C § 552(a)(4)(A) (1994).
127. SDC Dev. Corp., 542 F.2d at 1118. See generally supra note 97, and accompanying
text.
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guidance on how to clarify these terms, and concluded that Congress
intended for the statute's disclosure provisions to apply primarily to
information concerning the "structure, operation, and decision-making
procedure" of federal agencies. 128
The Ninth Circuit then examined the MEDLARS tapes to deter-
mine if they fell within the aforementioned description of information
that qualified for disclosure, and made three findings. First, the court
said there was a difference between the information in the MEDLARS
tapes and the software system that delivers the information. 129  The
court said the agency was not trying to protect its information; the
agency simply wanted to protect its software delivery system, which
"constitutes a highly valuable commodity."' 30  The appellate court
concluded that the agency was not contravening the legislative intent of
the FOIA because the agency did not seek to "mask its processes or
functions from public scrutiny... [I]ts principal mission is the orderly
dissemination of material it has collected. The agency is seeking to
protect not its information, but rather its system for delivering that in-
formation."'131
The software system's value led to the court's second finding:
There was an economic issue behind disclosure.132 The court said that
by allowing any requester to gain access to the system at a nominal
charge, the information gathering and dissemination function of the
agency would be substantially impaired. 133 The impairment would re-
sult because the National Library of Medicine had entered into agree-
ments under which universities and foreign governments can have the
tapes at no cost in exchange for services such as cataloguing, indexing,
128. SDCDev. Corp., 542 F.2d at 1119. The Ninth Circuit cited H. REP. No. 89-1497, at 5-6
(1966) as "particularly enlightening." Il at n.7. The sections in the House report cited in the SDC
Dev. Corp. v. Mathews opinion outlined a history of disclosure abuses by federal agencies in the
years before the FOIA was enacted. From 1946 until the FOIA was signed into law in 1966, fed-
eral disclosure policies were controlled by The Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 1002
(1964) (current version at 5 U.S.C. §552 (1994)). However, the Ninth Circuit opinion does not
specify exactly what language in the report the court relied on as "particularly enlightening." It is
significant to note also that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Congressional intent for the FOIA's
purpose is substantially similar to the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act's "core pur-
pose" as articulated in a case decided 13 years later: U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm.,
489 U.S. 749,774-75 (1989). The Reporters Committee decision will be discussed in detail later
in this analysis.
129. See SDC Dev. Corp., 542 F.2d at 1120.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. See id.
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and abstracting of medical publications to update the database. 34
Thus, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, contractual relations with these or-
ganizations, "designed to increase the agency's ability to acquire and
catalog medical information, would be destroyed if the tapes could be
obtained essentially for free."' 35 The court found that releasing the
database at a nominal fee to the general public and private sector
would undermine the system's commercial value, depriving the agency
of income to defray the $10 million cost of developing and continually
updating the system. 36 In other words, users would not pay the market
rate for commercial access to the MEDLARS tapes if they could ob-
tain the tapes for a nominal FOIA fee.
Third, the court made a distinction between the types of records
that Congress intended to make available through the FOIA and the
MEDLARS tapes. The court held that the MEDLARS tapes did not
fall within any of the categories of information that Congress intended
the FOIA to control, namely, information that "directly reflect[ed] the
structure, operation, or decision-making functions" of federal agen-
cies. 37 Instead, the court reasoned that the MEDLARS tapes qualified
as library reference materials because the tapes were compiled by the
National Library of Medicine.'38 Furthermore, under the National Li-
brary of Medicine Act, 39 the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare has wide discretion in setting charges for the use of library
materials. 40 Therefore, the court of appeals concluded, the National
Library of Medicine was not obligated to provide the MEDLARS da-
tabase for the nominal cost of duplication.141
134. See SDCDev. Corp., 542 F.2d at 1118 n.4.
135. Id. at 1120.
136. See id at 1118, 1120.
137. Id. at 1120.
138. See id.
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 276(c) (repealed 1985).
The Secretary is authorized, after obtaining the advice and recommendations of the
Board [of Regents] .... to prescribe rules under which the Library will provide
copies of its publications or materials, or will make available its facilities for re-
search or its bibliographic, reference, or other services, to public and private agen-
cies and organizations, institutions, and individuals. Such rules may provide for
making available such publications, materials, facilities, or services (1) without
charge as a public service, or (2) upon a loan, exchange, or charge basis, or (3) in
appropriate circumstances, under contract arrangements made with a public or other
nonprofit agency, organization, or institution.
42 U.S.C. §§ 276,277 (repealed 1985).
141. See SDCDev. Corp., 542F.2d at 1121.
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Congress, however, explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit's ration-
ale in EFOIA Section 3.142 The House report accompanying the
EFOIA said Section 3 nullifies SDC Development Corp. v. Mathews
because the statute now clarifies that any information an agency has
created and is directly or indirectly disseminating remains subject to
the FOIA in any forms or formats.143 Indeed, Section 3 may open the
door for both commercial and non-profit FOIA users to gain access to
a wide variety of useful electronically stored information, such as
value-added computerized data, for nominal costs. But Section 3 also
raises some important questions. Does EFOIA Section 3 prevent the
government from selling - or at least recovering reasonable costs of
producing - databases compiled by federal agencies at a substantial,
expense to the public?
V. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF EFOIA SECTION 3
Critics argue that congressional rejection of SDC Development
Corp. v. Mathews, in particular, and efforts to widen the FOIA's ap-
plicability to computerized information, generally, may have far-
reaching and undesirable implications for federal agencies because of
the FOIA's liberal fee structure. 144 Under the FOIA fee guidelines es-
tablished in the 1986 amendments, fees recover only a small portion of
the costs of responding to requests.145 In 1992, for example, govern-
ment-wide costs for FOIA were reported at $108 million whereas fees
amounted to $8 million.146
Fee schedules are established by each agency according to stan-
dards set by the Office of Management and Budget. 47 The statute
provided that commercial requesters can be required to pay "reason-
able standard charges" at most for only the direct costs of search, du-
plication, or review. 48 When review costs are assessed, only the direct
costs incurred during the initial examination of a document may be re-
142. See H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 20 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448,3463.
143. See id.
144. See David MacDonald, The Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments: A
Minor Upgrade to Public Access Law, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 357 (1997); Fred
H. Cate, D. Annette Fields, James K. McBain, The Right to Privacy and the Public's Right to
Know: The "Central Purpose" of the Freedom of Information Act, 46 ADMiN. L. REv. 41 (1994).
145. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(i-vii) (1994).
146. See Michael Moss, Public Eye: Federal Service Gets Wider Use by Sleuths, Snoops
and Senators, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 1996, at Al.
147. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(i) (1994). See also Office of Management and Budget,
Freedom of Information Act Fees, 52 Fed. Reg. 10012 (Mar. 27, 1987).
148. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(I) (1994).
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covered. 49 Review costs may not include any expenses incurred in re-
solving issues of law or policy that may be raised in the course of
processing a request.150
Charges are limited to only document duplication costs if the rec-
ords are not sought for commercial use, and if the request is from an
educational or noncommercial scientific institution whose purpose is
scholarly or scientific research, or from a representative of the news
media.151 Charges can be waived or reduced below the fees established
for noncommercial users if disclosure would be in the public interest
"because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding
of the operations or activities" of the government. 52
As a result of Congress' decision to override SDC Development
Corp. v. Mathews, agencies that compile value-added data can suffer
adverse economic consequences, argued attorney David MacDonald. 53
By permitting "indiscriminate access" to value-added proprietary data-
bases under the FOIA fee structure, he asserted, agencies are prevented
from recovering reasonable costs from private parties who benefit
commercially from access to the information.154
MacDonald contended that the Ninth Circuit decision in SDC De-
velopment Corp v. Mathews. was correct in making an important dis-
tinction between proprietary information systems and agency records
reachable under the FOIA.' 55 In his view, the distinction protected
value-added information contained in the databases such as
MEDLARS from access under the FOIA fee structure. 5 6
By overriding the Ninth Circuit decision, Congress established
that all electronic records would be subject to disclosure, including in-
formation libraries and other value-added data. 57 Consequently, agen-
cies that produce value-added information may find it difficult to pro-
tect their substantial investments, and this is a reasonable concern.'58
The expense of building and maintaining some databases can run
into the millions of dollars. It cost the National Library of Medicine
149. See id. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iv).
150. See id.
151. See id. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(1).
152. Id. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii).
153. See MacDonald, supra note 144, at 379.
154. a at388.
155. See id. at 373.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See MacDonald, supra note 144, at 380.
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$10 million to create the MEDLARS family of databases in 1976.159
The technology of that time was rudimentary and relatively costly
compared to the technology emerging today. To illustrate this point,
compare the cost and capability of a personal computer today with a
personal computer built 10 or even five years ago. Still, the new tech-
nology remains very expensive, as it enables the government to embark
on highly complex projects to produce value-added data that were not
imagined by most people a quarter of a century ago. For example, a
single municipal geographic information system (GIS) can cost $8
million to complete, 60 and this price tag is modest compared to what it
can cost to create and maintain the kinds of databases used by federal
agencies.
Extending FOIA access to the growing number of computerized
records in general would increase agency costs exponentially, 6' ac-
cording to Professor Fred H. Cate and his colleagues. Cate argued that
the FOIA already has been extended "far beyond its original purpose"
by requesters, agencies, litigants, and courts. 162 The vast majority of
FOIA requesters do not seek information about government activities,
he said, but rather want information about business competitors, op-
posing parties in litigation, and the activities of other non-governmental
entities. 163
Cate said that extending the applicability of the FOIA violates the
purpose for which the Act was created and also costs taxpayers bil-
lions of dollars responding to requests "seeking no information 'about
what the government is up to."' 64 The costs associated with "this
misuse of the FOIA increase as more requesters use the Act to discover
information about non-governmental activities and as the volume of
agency records subject to the FOIA expands," Cate and his colleagues
159. See SDC Dev. Corp. v. Mathews, 542 F.2d 1116, 1118 (1976).
160. See Gary H. Anthes and Mindy Blodgett, States Eye Online Revenues,
COMPuTERWvORLD, Aug. 19, 1996, at 26. The subject of this article was an $8 million geographic
information system produced by the city of Phoenix.
161. See Cate, supra note 144, at 66.
162. See Cate, supra note 144, at 65.
163. See Cate, supra note 144, at 65.
164. Cate, supra note 144, at 65 (quoting U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S.
749, 772-773 (1989)). Cate quotes the often cited remark- "what the Government is up to"- to
allude to the Reporters Committee opinion, which supports Cate's point of view and which will be
discussed in detail in Part V of this analysis. But actually, this remark derives from a passage in an
article written by historian Henry Steele Commager for THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Oct.
5, 1972, at 7. See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
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said.165 "Those costs threaten to increase exponentially, however, if
the FOIA is applied to the increasing number of computerized agency
records." 166
The burgeoning use of the federal disclosure statute, which Pro-
fessor Cate said prompted his concerns, 167 is well documented. The
FOIA's expanded use since its enactment in 1966 is reflected in its
costs of operation. FOJA operations cost $108 million in 1992,168 rep-
resenting an increase of about $17 million over the previous year. 69
By comparison, the FOIA's government-wide costs in 1966 were
$50,000.170 Even allowing for inflation during this 26-year-period, the
increase in FOIA costs is substantial.
Patricia M. Wald, Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, observed in 1984 that "like all freedoms, the
FOIA turned out to have its price, financially and otherwise, and some
costs proved to be more unexpected than others. 171 Judge Wald ex-
plained that within a decade after the FOIA was enacted, businesses
realized they could use the FOIA to get information about competitors,
and lawyers found they could often extract facts faster through FOIA
requests than through civil discovery.7 2 The FOIA became a "mini-
industry," she wrote, providing information mainly to businesses or
their lawyers.173 She cited a General Accounting Office survey that
showed only one out of every 20 FOIA requests was made by a jour-
nalist, a scholar, or an author.174
165. See Cate, supra note 144, at 66. Cate and his co-authors cited a 1982 article by Antonin
Scalia, in which Scalia described the FOIA as "the Taj Mahal of the Doctrine of Unanticipated
Consequences, the Sistine Chapel of Cost-Benefit Analysis ignored." See Scalia, supra note 39, at
15.
166. See Cate, supra note 144, at 66.
167. Cate, supra note 144, at 66.
168. See Moss, supra note 146 at Al. See also Eric J. Sinrod, Freedom ofinformation Act
Response Deadlines: Bridging the Gap Between Legislative Intent and Economic Reality, 43
AM. U. L. REv. 325,334 (1994).
169. See Sinrod, supra note 168, at 334.
170. Edward C. Schmnults, U.S. Deputy Attorney General, FOIAct Classic Example of Law
that Needs Improving, reprinted in Freedom of Information Act: Hearings on S. 587, S. 1235, S.
1247, S. 1730, and S. 1751. Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 880 (1981).
171. Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act: A Short Case Study in the Perils
and Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMoRY L.J. 649, 664 (1984).
172. See id. at 665.
173. Id.
174. Id., (citing 1 1981 Senate Hearings 159, 161 (testimony of Jonathan Rose, Executive
Summary, Oversight of the Administration of the Federal Freedom of Information Act.))
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But MacDonald, Cate, and other critics 175 may be tolling warning
bells prematurely. Under current law, the test for FOIA applicability
arguably would already exclude many of the materials that critics fear
would be subject to disclosure. This test was established in a seminal
1989 Supreme Court case, U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press.176 Reporters Committee is a
most important ruling because it stands for the Supreme Court's cur-
rent interpretation of the FOIA's central purpose. 177
VI. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE v. REPORTERS COMMITTEE
The Supreme Court held unanimously in Reporters Committee
that federal agencies can withhold computerized FBI compilations of
"rap sheets" on private citizens even though the information might be
found in public records available in local or state offices.178 In an
opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that the
disclosure of compilations of an individual's criminal records is an
unwarranted invasion of privacy under Exemption 7(C), the FOIA law
enforcement exception, when the request does not seek official infor-
mation that directly reveals government operations or activities. 179
The decision ended an 11-year effort by CBS reporter Robert
Schakne and the Reporters Committee for the Freedom of the Press to
obtain the FBI's rap sheet- a record of arrests, indictments, convic-
tions, or acquittals - about reputed crime figure Charles Medico.8 0
Schakne was investigating Medico because Medico's company alleg-
edly received defense contracts in exchange for political contributions
to a corrupt Pennsylvania Congressman, Daniel J. Flood.181 The Penn-
175. See George B. Turbow, Protecting Informational Privacy in the Information Society,
10 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 521 (1990) (supporting the Supreme Court decision in U.S. Dep't of Justice
v. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749 (1989)). In Reporters Committee, the Court presented the
"core purpose" doctrine that limits disclosure of private information under the FOIA. Id. at 774-75.
176. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
177. See id. at 774.
178. See iL at 763.
179. See id. at 773-75.
180. See id. at 757.
181. See id. Flood pleaded guilty on Feb. 26, 1980 to conspiracy to violate federal campaign
laws and was placed on probation for a year. He was convicted of conspiracy to solicit campaign
contributions from persons seeking federal government contracts. The 76-year-old Pennsylvania
Democrat had resigned from the House Jan. 31, 1980. He was tried on charges of bribery, perjury
and conspiracy in 1979. However, that trial, held in U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C.,
ended in a mistrial on Feb. 3, 1979, when jurors could not reach a decision after three days of delib-
erations. See Laura Kieman, Flood Is Placed on Year's Probation, THE WASHINGTON POST, Feb.
27, 1980, at AS.
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sylvania Crime Commission had identified Medico Industries as a le-
gitimate business dominated by organized-crime figures. t8 2 The FBI
provided Schakne with information about three of Charles Medico's
brothers, who were deceased, but the agency refused to release the re-
quested information about Charles Medico, who was still living. 83
Schakne brought suit in U.S. District Court for the District of Colum-
bia, and the district court granted the FBI's motion for summary judg-
ment, holding that the information was protected under FOIA Exemp-
tion 7(C) t14 and disclosure would be an unwarranted invasion of
Charles Medico's privacy. 85 The D.C. Circuit reversed, concluding
182. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749,757 (1989).
183. See id.
184. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1994). The exemption states that the FOIA does not apply to
matters that are "(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (C) could reasonably be
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Exemption 7(C) is one of two
privacy exceptions to the FOIA. The other exception, Exemption 6, pertains to "personnel and
medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted inva-
sion of personal privacy." Id. § 552(b)6.
Two key differences between the exemptions are evident in the statutory language. First,
Exemption 6 calls for "a clearly unwarranted invasion" of privacy (italics added). Id. Exemption
7 requires a less strict standard, asking an agency to show only "an unwarranted invasion of pri-
vacy." Id. § 552(b)(7)(C). Second, Exemption 6 applies to information that, if disclosed, "would
constitute" an invasion of privacy (italics added). Id. § 552(b)(6). Exemption 7, on the other hand,
applies to information, the disclosure of which "could reasonably be expected to constitute" an
invasion of privacy (italics added). Id. § 552(b)(7)(C).
The difference in language was intentional. The legislative history shows that Exemption
7(C), as originally proposed by Sen. Gary Hart, also required a "clearly' unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy. See 120 CONG. REC. 17,033 (1974). However, the word "clearly" was dropped
by the Conference Committee as a concession in negotiations with President Ford to get the Act
approved. See CONG. REP. No. 93-1380, at 11 (1974). By dropping "clearly," the Exemption less-
ened the agency's burden to meet the test. See O'REELLY, supra note 40, at § 17.09, 17-44. Legis-
lators also agreed to the difference in language between "would" in Exemption 6, and "could rea-
sonably be expected" in Exemption 7(C) in order enact the legislation.
As a result, courts have concluded that Exemption 7(C) allows law enforcement officers
more latitude to withhold records to protect the privacy of individuals than is permitted under the
stricter standard of Exemption 6. See U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749,
755-756 (1989). Additionally, Exemption 7(C) means the public interest in disclosure carries less
weight. Id.
In making a determination in a privacy-interests case under Exemption 7(C), the courts
uses a two-step test. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1994). First, the documents must have been
compiled for law enforcement reasons because this Exemption pertains only to investigative rec-
ords. Second, the govemment must prove that the disclosure could "reasonably be expected to con-
stitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy." Id.
Likewise, the courts use a similar test in deciding an Exemption 6 privacy-interests case.
The courts first must determine if the records fall within the definition of "personnel," "medical" or
"similar" files. L § 552(b)(6) (1994). Second, the courts must balance the invasion of the individ-
ual's personal privacy against the public benefit that would result from disclosure. To withhold
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that the government cannot claim a privacy interest in FBI-compiled
records that would be available to the public if sought from the indi-
vidual law enforcement agencies.186
But the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit and permitted
the FBI to withhold the information. The Court said it reached its out-
come by balancing the individual's right of privacy against the public
interest in disclosure.187 The Court held that the public interest to be
balanced against the privacy interest is that of disclosing only informa-
tion that directly reveals the operations or activities of the govern-
ment. 88
Justice Stevens wrote that the FOIA's "central purpose is to en-
sure that the government's activities be opened to the sharp eye of
public scrutiny, not that information about private citizens that hap-
pens to be in the warehouse of the government be so disclosed."'89 The
Court concluded that disclosure of a computerized compilation of an
individual's criminal records, which do not directly reveal governmen-
tal operations or performance, is an unwarranted invasion of privacy
because the information falls "outside the ambit of the public interest
that the FOIA was enacted to serve." 90 In the Court's view, in other
words, the rap sheets did not directly reveal information about how the
government operates and, therefore, could be withheld.' 9' The infor-
mation would "tell us nothing directly about the character of the Con-
gressman's behavior," Justice Stevens wrote. 92 "Nor would it tell us
anything about the conduct of the Department of Defense (DOD) in
awarding one or more contracts to the Medico Company." 93
Justice Stevens made a particular point to note that the request
was for computerized information and that computerization of personal
information poses a special potential threat to privacy. 94 The Court
acknowledged that Medico's criminal history of arrests, indictments,
information, the government must show that the disclosure "would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of privacy." See Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 357, 371 (1972).
185. See U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749, 757-59 (1989).
186. See Reporters Comm. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 816 F.2d 730, 740 (1987).
187. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749,772-73 (1989) (citing Department of the Air Force
v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352,372 (1976)).
188. Seeid.
189. See id at 774.
190. Id. at775.
191. See id. at 774-75.
192. Id. at774.
193. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749, 774 (1989).
194. See id. at 764, 770-71.
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and convictions are public records, which might be acquired after a
search of courthouse files and records of local law enforcement agen-
cies that investigated and prosecuted him. 95 But Justice Stevens em-
phasized that Schakne sought a computerized compilation of all of this
information, and the privacy interest in a rap sheet is substantial. 96
"The substantial character of that interest is affected by the fact that in
today's society the computer can accumulate and store information
that would otherwise have surely been forgotten long before a person
attains the age of 80, when the FBI's rap sheets are discarded."' 97
Justice Stevens said there is a "vast difference between the public rec-
ords that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files,
county archives, and local police stations throughout the country and a
computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse of informa-
tion."198
The Reporters Committee majority position was criticized, how-
ever, in a concurring opinion by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, joined by
Justice Brennan. Justice Blackmun argued that the Court opinion ex-
empting all rap-sheet information from the FOIA's disclosure require-
ments was overbroad in light of Exemption 7(C)'s plain language, leg-
islative history, and case law.199 He characterized the Court majority's
"bright-line rule" as not basically sound.200 To illustrate his point,
Justice Blackmun presented a hypothetical situation in which a rap
sheet disclosed a congressional candidate's conviction of tax fraud be-
fore he ran for office. 20' The FBI's disclosure of that information
could not reasonably be expected to constitute an invasion of personal
privacy, much less an unwarranted invasion, because the candidate
gave up any interest in preventing disclosure of this information when
he chose to run for office, Justice Blackmun said.202 "I would not
adopt the Court's bright-line approach but would leave the door open
for the disclosure of rap-sheet information in some circumstances," he
concluded. 203
195. Id at 764.
196. See id. at 771.
197. Id.
198. Reporter Comm., 489 U.S. 749, 764 (1989).
199. See id. at 780-81 (Blackmun, I., concurring).
200. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S.749, 780 (1989).
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. Id. at 781.
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The Reporters Committee ruling is very significant because its
holding stands for the Supreme Court's current interpretation of the
FOIA's purpose - to provide public access only to official informa-
tion that directly reveals governmental operations or activities.204 This
ruling represents a significantly narrower interpretation of the FOIA's
scope than the Court found in U.S. Department of the Air Force v.
Rose 05 in 1976. The Rose Court said the FOIA's legislative history
clearly shows that Congress intended for the "broadly conceived" Act
to permit access to official information and open agency action to pub-
lic scrutiny. 20 6 Justice Brennan emphasized in Rose that the exemp-
tions are limited, must be narrowly construed, 20 7 and do not obscure
the fact that disclosure is the FOIA's dominant objective. 208
The Reporters Committee opinion set forth the principle that the
"statutory purpose" of the FOIA is to disclose only official information
that "sheds light on an agency's performance." 209 By so holding, the
Court established a "conduct test" as a threshold question that a lower
court must determine, before it examines whether requested informa-
tion falls within one of the nine exemptions.210
An analysis of the Court's reasoning in Reporters Committee
shows that its conduct test derives from a two-step process. First, the
Court established that the FOIA's basic policy of disclosure "focuses
on the citizens' right to be informed about 'what their government is up
to."'' 211 Second, the Court equated the public's need to know "what
their government is up to" with a need to evaluate government per-
formance:
Official information that sheds light on an agency's performance
of its statutory duties falls squarely within that statutory purpose.
That purpose, however, is not fostered by disclosure of informa-
204. See id. at 773-75.
205. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
206. Id. at 361 (citing Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973)).
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749,780 (1989).
210. See id.
211. Il at 773. The reference to citizens having a right to know "what their government is up
to," comes from an Oct. 5, 1972, article written by historian Henry Steele Commager in THE NEw
YORK REVIEW OF BooKs. A passage from Commager's article was quoted by Justice William 0.
Douglas in his dissent to Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 105 (1973). The
entire passage bears repeating because the Reporters Committee opinion quotes the phrase several
times. Commager wrote: "The generation that made the nation thought secrecy in government one
of the instruments of Old World tyranny and committed itself to the principle that a democracy can-
not function unless the people are permitted to know what their government is up to."
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tion about private citizens that is accumulated in various govern-
ment files but that reveals little or nothing about an agency's own
conduct. In this case - and presumably in the typical case in
which one private citizen is seeking information about another -
the requester does not intend to discover anything about the con-
duct of the agency that has possession of the requested records.
Indeed, response to this request would not shed light on the con-
duct of any Governmental agency or official.212  (Emphasis
added.)
In other words, although federal agencies collect vast amounts of
information on virtually every facet of society, compiled at a tremen-
dous expense to the public, the public is entitled to gain access to only
a limited class of information as prescribed by the Court's narrowly
drawn "core purpose" of the Freedom of Information Act.213 The
Court's narrow interpretation of the FOIA's purpose seemingly ignores
the public interest value of a wealth of government-held information
that does not reveal government operations or conduct Such informa-
tion includes census data, economic data, and public health and safety
information, ranging from the commercial aircraft maintenance records
of the FAA to the results of clinical trials on over-the-counter drugs
regulated by the FDA.
As a result of the Court's narrow interpretation of the FOIA's
central purpose, dire warnings about EFOIA Section 3's implications
are largely overstated. One critic cautioned that Congress's decision to
override SDC Development Corp v. Mathews. would permit indis-
criminate access to value-added proprietary databases created by fed-
eral agencies, thus preventing the government from recovering the sub-
stantial costs of compiling the information.214
However, under the Reporters Committee conduct test, it seems
unlikely that types of information like the data in the MEDLARS tapes
would qualify for disclosure. As the Supreme Court plainly said in a
1997 ruling that relied on Reporters Committee as precedent: "[T]he
only relevant public interest in the FOIA balancing analysis" is "the
extent to which disclosure of the information 'sheds light on an
agency's performance of its statutory duties' or otherwise lets citizens
know 'what their government is up to.' ' 215
212. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773.
213. See id. at 774-75.
214. See MacDonald, supra note 144, at 387.
215. Bibles v. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n., 516 U.S. 975, 795 (1997) (quoting U.S. Dep't
of Defense v. F.L.R.A., 510 U.S 487, 497 (1994), and U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm.,
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VII. DISCUSSION
Congress intended for EFOIA Section 3216 to provide access to
federal agency databases containing the kinds of public interest infor-
mation found in the MEDLARS tapes.217 Meanwhile, however, the
decision in U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm.2 18 still
stands for the proposition that the scope of the FOTA is limited 19 and
would exclude precisely the kind of information contained in the
MEDLARS tapes. Under the Court's central purpose theory, 220 the
tapes would not directly reveal government operations or activities and
would therefore flunk the conduct test.221
Consequently, the future implications of Section 3 remain elusive
even though the MEDLINE/MEDLARS question has been settled.
The National Library of Medicine made both services available to the
public free of charge on the Internet as of June 26, 1997.222
MEDLINE users now can gain access to the online terminal service on
the World Wide Web.223 In addition to MEDLINE, the National Li-
brary of Medicine is also making the MEDLARS databases available
online.2 24 Although the MEDLINE/MEDLARS question is resolved,
489 U.S. at 773). In Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n., the Supreme Court held that the Bureau of
Land Management could reject a FOIA request from an Oregon environmental group that sought a
list of names of persons who receive mailings from the BLM on the government's plans for the fu-
ture of the Oregon high desert. The Supreme Court also relied on Reporter's Committee as prece-
dent in two earlier FOIA Exemption 6 privacy cases, U.S. Dep't of Defense v. Federal Labor Rela-
tions Auth., 510 U.S. 487 (1994) (holding that the release of home addresses of government
employees to union organizers would be a "clearly unwarranted" invasion of privacy); and U.S.
Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164 (1991) (holding that the release of identifying information
about Haitian refugees, who fled to the United States and were sent back involuntarily to Haiti,
could be withheld because disclosure would constitute a "clearly unwarranted" invasion of pri-
vacy).
216. See Electronic Freedom of Information Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.104-231, §3, 110 Stat.
3048, 3049 (1996) (codified as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (1994)).
217. See H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 20 (1996).
218. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
219. See id. at 773-75.
220. See id. at 774.
221. See iL at 773.
222. See National Library of Medicine homepage (visited July 7, 1998)
<http://www.nlm.nih.gov>. See also Peter Gomer, Health Consumers Get Web Break U.S. Al-
lows Free, Open Internet Access to Medical Library, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 29, 1997; Sheryl
Gay Stolberg, Now, Prescribing Just What the Patient Ordered, NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 10,
1997.
223. See id.
224. In an interview with the author, Sheldon Kotzin, Chief of the Bibliographic services divi-
sion of the National Library of Medicine, said "the process of making the MEDLARS family of
databases available for free through MEDLINE began in August of 1997." The process was still
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the much larger issue it represented from the outset remains unsettled.
The intent behind EFOIA Section 3 seems to clash with the "core pur-
pose" rationale expressed by the Supreme Court in Reporters Com-
mittee. 225 Perhaps some in Congress intended Section 3 to be an at-
tack on Reporters Committee, but the evidence is elusive.
Some members of the Senate, at least, were fully aware of the
Reporters Committee ruling's profound consequences on the scope of
the FOIA.226 The record shows that the Senate Committee on the Judi-
ciary reached a consensus in 1995 that the Reporters Committee deci-
sion conflicted with the FOIA's general philosophy of full disclo-
sure.227 This view was articulated in a Senate report that accompanied
a 1995 precursor to the House-sponsored EFOIA of 1996 - The
Electronic Freedom of Information Improvement Act of 1995, which
was a Senate bill introduced by Senator Leahy.221 In the Senate report,
Leahy directly addressed the Supreme Court's central purpose theory,
and concluded in strongly worded terms that the Court construed the
purpose of the FOIA too narrowly in Reporters Committee.229
The purpose of the FOIA is not limited to making agency records
and information available to the public only in cases where such
material would shed light on the activities and operations of Gov-
ernment. Effort by the courts to articulate a 'core purpose' for
which information should be released imposes a limitation on the
FOIA which Congress did not intend and which cannot be found
in its language, and distorts the broader import of the Act in ef-
fectuating Government openness. 230
Leahy's bill was unanimously approved by the Committee on the
Judiciary on April 25, 1996,231 but congressional action on the Senate
proposal ended there. After negotiations with the House, Leahy's Sen-
ate bill was revised and reintroduced as House bill, H.R. 3802 on July
12, 1996.232 Three months later, that bill was signed into law as the
Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996
under way at the time of the interview, April 23, 1998, and was several months from completion, he
said.
225. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
226. See S. REP.No. 104-272, at 6 (1996).
227. See id.
228. See S. 1090, 104th Cong. (1996).
229. See S. REP. NO. 104-272, at 26-27 (1996).
230. Id.
231. See id. at 6.
232. See H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 14 (1996).
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(EFOIA).2 33 However, the House report accompanying the legislation
failed to contain any language criticizing the Reporters Committee de-
cision.
The omission of such clarifying language makes it possible for
Reporters Committee to trump EFOIA Section 3 because there is
nothing in the statutory language of Section 3 to specifically override
Reporters Committee.2 34  The new FOIA language contained in Sec-
tion 3 offers a definition of "record." "The term 'record' and any other
term used in this section in reference to information includes any in-
formation that would be an agency record subject to the requirements
of this section when maintained by an agency in any format, including
electronic format." 235 However, the attack on SDC Development Corp
v. Mathews, contained in the EFOIA House report's explanation of
Section 3's goals, made no mention of Reporters Committee.236
As a result, the Reporters Committee ruling remains a serious
threat to the future of public access to information held by federal
agencies. There already is a long line of lower court FOIA cases that
have relied on the Reporters Committee central purpose test.237  In
these cases, the lower courts have used the central purpose analysis
233. See Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231,
§§ 1-12, 110 Stat. 3048 (1996) (codified as amended in various sections of 5 U.S.C. § 552).
234. At least one federal court already has held that the EFOIA does not broaden the narrow
scope of the statute as articulated in Reporters Comm. See O'Kane v. U.S. Customs Service, No.
95-0683-CIV-MORENO (S.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 1997). U.S. District Judge Federico A. Moreno held
that if "Congress intended to significantly enlarge the scope of the public interest served by FOIA,
Congress could have taken a clear and more direct approach, most likely by amending the exemp-
tions themselves. This they did not do.'
235. See supra note 233, § 3 (1996) (codified as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)).
236. See H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 20 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448,3463.
237. See The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Report on Responses and Non-
Response of the Executive and Judicial Branches to Congress' Finding That the FOI Act Serves
"Any Purpose, " prepared by request of the Chairman, Subcommittee on Government Management,
Information and Technology of the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, July
2, 1998. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers Intl. Ass'n, Local 19 v. U.S. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 135
F.3d 891, 903 (3d Cir. 1998); Kimberlin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 139 F.3d 944, 948 (D.C. Cir.
1998); McQueen v. United States, 2 F.R.D. 522, 526 (S.D. Tex. 1998); Ligomer v. Reno, 2
F.Supp.2d 400, 403-405 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Lurie v. Department of the Army, 970 F. Supp. 19, 32
(D.D.C. 1997); Center to Prevent Handgun Violence v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 981 F. Supp.
20, 24 (D.D.C. 1997); Sheet Metal Workers Intl. Ass'n, Local 9 v. U.S. Air Force, 63 F.3d 994,
996 (10th Cir. 1995); Manna v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 51 F.3d 1158, 1165-1166 (3d Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 515 U.S. 975 (1995); Exner v. U.S. Dep't of Justice F. Supp. 240, 244-45 (D.D.C.
1995); Jones v. FBI, 41 F.3d 238, 242 (6th Cir. 1994); Department of the Navy v. Federal Labor
Relations Authority, 975 F.2d 348, 353 (7th Cir. 1992); Hunt v. FBI, 972 F.2d 286, 287 (9th Cir.
1992); and Hale v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 973 F.2d 894, 898 (10th Cir. 1992).
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only in FOIA cases involving privacy Exemptions 6 or 7(C).238 But
several courts recently have applied the Supreme Court's central pur-
pose test 239 to FOIA cases whose issues go beyond the Act's traditional
privacy exemptions.2 40
Such a trend might find support among FOIA critics such as
MacDonald, Cate, and other commentators mentioned in this analysis.
Indeed, Cate and his colleagues wrote that in order to achieve the
FOIA's intended purpose, the Court's central purpose test "should be
the touchstone for disclosure." 241 They urged further that the central
purpose test should be expanded "beyond [privacy] Exemptions 7(C)
and 6, and beyond FOIA exemptions altogether."242
For access advocates, however, a broad application of the central
purpose test by the courts might be viewed as a disturbing trend that
could further constrict the ambit of the FOIA's statutory purpose as
evinced in its plain language and legislative history. This analysis
strongly suggests that Section 3 does not solve the problem posed by
Reporters Committee - namely, that the Court's interpretation of the
FOIA's purpose was narrowly drawn and contravened the statute's
legislative intent.
Finally, there is the question of how EFOIA Section 3 may affect
the government's ability to sell databases compiled by federal agencies.
Critics have cautioned that the extension of FOIA access to the grow-
ing number of computerized records in general would increase agency
costs exponentially. 243 In particular, it is argued, EFOIA Section 3
would permit indiscriminate access to value-added proprietary data-
bases created by federal agencies.244 In other words, no one would pay
238. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)6 & (b)7(C) (1994).
239. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749,774-75 (1989).
240. See Christopher P. Beall, The Exaltation of Privacy Doctrines Over Public Information
Law, 45 DuKLJ. 1249, 1273 (1996). Beall cited three cases in which courts have broadened the
applicability of the central purpose doctrine. See id. at 1273-80. See Sweetland v. Walters, 60 F.3d
852, 855 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that the Executive Residence staff of the White
House is not an "agency" under the FOIA); Baizer v. Department of the Air Force, 887 F. Supp.
225, 228 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that an electronic copy of the Air Forces' computerized data-
base of Supreme Court opinions should not be considered an "agency record" under the FOIA);
Vazquez-Gonzalez v. Shalala, Civ. No. 94-2100 (SEC), 1995 WL 67659 (D.P.R. Feb. 13, 1995)
(dismissing a suit brought by a physician, who sought information about Medicare billing practices,
because the requested information concerned the plaintiffs own commercial interests). See id. at
1273-80.
241. See Cate, supra note 144, at 45.
242. Id.
243. See id. at 66.
244. See MacDonald, supra note 144, at 387.
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for government databases if the information can be obtained for only
the nominal costs of reproduction under the FOIA. Consequently, the
argument goes, federal agencies would be prevented from recovering
reasonable costs from FOIA requesters who may benefit commercially
from the information.245
Both statutory law and case law illuminate this issue, and seem to
have settled this question in favor of the public interest in disclosure,
regardless of cost factors. The 1974 amendments to the FOJA directed
each agency to issue fee regulations for the recovery of only the direct
costs of search and duplication.246 And the 1986 amendments created
new provisions that liberalized fees and fee waivers further, as outlined
earlier in this article. 247 Congress explained that the rationale behind
the liberal fee provisions was to prevent agencies from using fees to
discourage FOIA requests or as obstacles to disclosure.248
Additionally, case law has upheld the fee system established in the
FOIA. The Ninth Circuit held in 1979 that the FOIA made no refer-
ence to "cost or convenience as a relevant factor" in the determination
to disclose information, including electronically stored data.249 The
Ninth Circuit noted that "[d]espite the massive expenses that can be
involved in even a single request, Congress has not limited access un-
der the Act."'2 0
VII. CONCLUSION
Section 3 of the Electronic Freedom of Information Act of 1996
advances the public interest in open government because it makes ex-
plicit that information an agency creates and directly or indirectly dis-
seminates remains subject to the FOIA in any of its forms or for-
mats.21 This provision reinforces a public policy that keeps federal
government information in the public domain. Such policy is important
for two reasons. First, the federal government is the largest single pro-
ducer, collector, consumer, and disseminator of information in the
245. See id.
246. See H.R. REP. No. 1380-93, at 7 (1974).
247. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(i-vii).
248. See S. REP. No. 1200-93 (1974).
249. See Long v. IRS, 596 F.2d 362, 366 (1979) (holding that the time and expense required
to "sanitize" IRS data, requested by an FOIA user, did not constitute an unreasonable burden to
place on an agency.)
250. Id. at367.
251. See Pub. L. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048, 3049, § 3 (1996) (codified as amended in subsec-
tion (f) of 5 U.S.C. § 552). See also H.R. REP. No. 795-104, at 20 (1996).
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United States.5 2 Some of this information can have direct and immedi-
ate political and economic consequences on the general public and the
private sector.253 Second, the government is increasingly creating, re-
cording, and storing information in digital form, which permits the data
to be more easily used, shared, and disseminated by both for-profit and
not-for-profit organizations.354
The danger that arises is that government control over informa-
tion in the computer age has the potential to allow federal agencies to
maintain information monopolies. 55 Congress expressed its concern
over information monopolies in the electronic era as early as 1986.256
In a report issued after a series of hearings on electronic collection and
dissemination of information by federal agencies, Congress concluded:
The new technology of electronic data distribution can undermine
the practical limitations and structures that have prevented Fed-
eral agencies from exploiting the ability to control access to and
distribution of the information that the government collects, cre-
ates and disseminates.257
Around the same time, the Second Circuit also explained the dan-
gers of information monopolies controlled by the government. 258 In a
1985 decision, the Second Circuit likened monopolistic activity to cen-
sorship when that court said the "evils inherent in allowing government
to create a monopoly over the dissemination of public information in
any form seem too obvious to require extended discussion.... Such
actions are an exercise of censorship that allows the government to
control the form and content of the information reaching the public."259
252. 1 See Office of Management and the Budget, Management of Federal Information Re-
sources Notice, § 7a, 59 Fed. Reg. 37,906, 37,910 (1994) (OMB Circular A-130). Some of the
information products generated by the government include census reports, economic statistics, agri-
cultural production reports, Securities and Exchange Commission filings, air transportation safety
reports, and food and drug safety reports, just to name a few.
253. See Gellman, supra note 13, at 1003.
254. See id.
255. See Committee on Government Operations, Electronic Collection and Dissemination of
Information by Federal Agencies: A Policy Overview, H.R. REP. 560-99, at 5 (1986). See also
Electronic Collection and Dissemination of Information by Federal Agencies, Hearings Before
a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
256. See H.R. REP. 560-99, at 4-9 (1986).
257. See id. at 9.
258. See Legi-Tech v. Keiper, 766 F.2d 728 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that commercial infor-
mation users are entitled to the same access to a New York state-owned database as the general
public).
259. ld. at 733.
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In the final analysis, EFOIA Section 3, therefore, serves the important
purpose of undercutting efforts by federal agencies to create informa-
tion monopolies in which the government may be a partner.
Meanwhile, it is poor public policy for Congress to allow the con-
flict between the FOIA and the 1989 Reporters Committee ruling to
remain unresolved for so long - a decade has elapsed since the Court
handed down its FOIA core purpose ruling.2 60 The problem is that the
Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the FOIA's purpose can po-
tentially undermine the very policy that EFOIA Section 3 was intended
to advance.
In EFOIA Section 3, Congress seemed to broaden public access
rights. But the Reporters Committee ruling, on the other hand, estab-
lished that the "statutory purpose" of the FOIA is to disclose only offi-
cial information that "sheds light on an agency's performance. '261
This conflict, which can be likened to driving a car with one foot on the
gas pedal and one foot on the brake, needs to be resolved.
There is ample precedent for Congress to override the Supreme
Court's ruling in order to settle this conflict. As noted earlier in this
article, Congress in 1974 revised Exemption 1, the national security
exemption, in direct response to a 1973 Supreme Court decision in
EPA v. Mink.262 And in 1976, Congress amended the FOIA to clarify
Exemption 3 in the aftermath of a 1975 Supreme Court decision, Ad-
ministrator, FAA v. Robertson.263
An FOIA amendment aimed at overriding Reporters Committee
would serve the nation's democratic interests in open government and
comport with the intent of the Freedom of Information Act as articu-
lated by Congress when it originally crafted the statute. The spirit of
260. See U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749
(1989).
261. Id. at773.
262. Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973). See discussion supra
Part ]I.
263. Adm'r, Federal Aviation Admn., 422 U.S. 255 (1975). See discussion supra Part If.
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the Act was expressed by Senator Edward V. Long, who, in introduc-
ing the FOIA legislation in 1965, quoted James Madison:
A popular Government, without popular information, or the
means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy;
or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a
people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves
with the power which knowledge gives.264
264. See S. REP. No. 89-813, at 2-3 (1965). Actually, Sen. Long did not get Madison's quote
quite right. The quotation in the above text is correct. Letter from James Madison to William T.
Berry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRmNGS OF JAMES MADISON, at 103 (Gaillard A. Hunt ed.,
1910). Sen. Long juxtaposed the order of the first and last sentences of the original quotation, and
that is how Madison's remarks are printed in the 1965 Senate report. FOIA legislators and com-
mentaries on the Act have ever since cited Madison to support the view that public access to gov-
ernment information has historic roots traceable to the Framers. The philosophy Madison expressed
in the quotation certainly can be interpreted in this regard, but it is important to note that the com-
ment actually was made in the context of expanding public education. See Paul H. Gates, Jr. and
Bill F. Chamberlin, Madison Misinterpreted: Historical Presentism Skews Scholarship, 13
AMERIcAN JOURNAusM 38 (1996).
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